










Within Europe there are three principal regional organizations which play a role in the 
protection and promotion of human rights: the Council of Europe (COE); the European 
Union (EU); and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The 
geographic coverage, institutional and legal arrangements, and relative approaches of each to 
addressing and eradicating torture and other ill-treatment mean that whilst distinct, there are 
some considerable areas of overlap between them. In what follows, the relevant legal and 
institutional frameworks and the work of these three systems to address the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment are introduced. A very brief 
contextual overview of the three systems within which normative and institutional means of 
addressing torture and ill-treatment have been developed is followed by sections focusing on 
the COE and EU and their legal frameworks and principal institutions and mechanisms. This 
is followed by a more detailed overview of how torture and ill-treatment is addressed by the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), in particular through the jurisprudence of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Areas of complementarity and of tension in 
approaches to torture across the European systems and institutions are highlighted and 
examined in the following discussion as they arise.   




Within Europe, the COE, EU and OSCE all have mandated institutions whose work relates to 
the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. Helpfully, albeit incidentally, all Member States 
of the EU are also Members of the COE, and likewise all COE States are 'participants' in the 
OSCE. With 57 participating states, the OSCE embraces the largest area, including the USA 
and Canada. The COE has a membership of 47 states, and the EU (post-Brexit) 27. It is 
beyond the scope of this overview to set out the structure or workings of these organizations 
more generally, the focus being on their work relevant to the prohibition of torture and ill-
treatment. This said, the historical foundation and underlying philosophy of each helps to 
explain their respective approaches and levels of engagement with both torture and ill-
treatment, and human rights more broadly.  
 
The key reason for the creation of each organisation concerned the desire to foster peace and 
stability in the region. Following the Second World War thinking pulled in two competing 
directions. On one side a supranational system, a 'United State of Europe', marked by deep 
economic integration and overarching political structures was advocated. On the other, an 
intergovernmental model was favoured which would retain more fully the individual 
sovereignty of its Member States but nevertheless foster cooperation between them, including 
institutions for the promotion and protection of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. 
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The history is covered capably elsewhere,1 but the net outcome was that Europe developed 
both. In the organizations known to us today, the supranational, integrationist preference gave 
rise ultimately to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 which, in 1993, became 
the EU.2 The intergovernmental path was reflected in the establishment of the COE in 1949.  
 
Whilst the EEC was centred on economics, the COE made 'the maintenance and further 
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms'3 central to its work from the outset. 
One of its key treaties, concluded in 1950, is the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) which sets out the (mainly civil and political) rights to be 
protected and created the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The COE's most 
notable contribution in respect of torture and ill-treatment specifically is the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, which entered into force in 1989, and the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture that it creates.4 Additionally, in 1999 the COE established the office of 
Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights5 which works for the promotion and 
protection of human rights in Europe. 
 
Conversely, the EU developed its interest in human rights protection much later. This was 
marked particularly by the adoption of its Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000, though it 
was not until the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 that the Charter gained full legal status, making it 
binding on EU institutions and states. In 2007, the EU created the European Union 
Fundamental Rights Agency6 some of whose work has been relevant to the fight against 
torture. The EU has also produced Guidelines on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, their most recent iteration in September 2019.7 
 
Regarding the relationship between the EU and the ECHR, the Lisbon Treaty states that the 
EU 'shall accede' to the ECHR.8 However, a 2014 decision from the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) rendered this all but impossible in practice.9 It has not happened and 
it is unlikely that it ever will.  
 
The OSCE came into being much later in 1975 as the 'Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe' with the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. It was created against the 
backdrop of the Cold War 'as a security organisation ... aimed at creating a comprehensive 
framework for peace and stability in Europe'.10 The legal status of the OSCE as an 
                                                 
1 Greer, S, Gerrards, J and Slowe, R, Human Rights in the Council of Europe and the European Union 
(Cambridge University Press, 2018). 
2 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated Version), Treaty of Maastricht (OJ C 325/5, 7 December 1992).  
3 Statute of the Council of Europe, 5th May 1949, ETS no 001, Article 1(b). 
4 See below and Chapter XXX of this volume.  
5 Resolution 99(50) on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 7 May 1999 at its 104th Session).  
6 Council Regulation (EC) no 168/2007 of 15 February 2007 establishing a European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights.  
7 Guidelines to EU policy towards third countries on torture, and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment - 2019 Revision of the Guidelines, adopted by the Council at its 3712th meeting held on 16 
September 2019. 
8 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community (OJ 2007/C 306/01, 17 December 2007), Article 6(2).  
9 Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:4:2454. See Greer, 
Gerrards and Slowe (n 1 above), 37-8.  
10 Zannier, L, ‘Human Rights and the OSCE's comprehensive Security concept' in Vienna Manual on Human 
Rights’ (OSCE, 2012). Available at: https://www.osce.org/sg/103964?download=true  
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international organization remains a matter of some debate: it has avoided the creation of 
treaties, including its founding documents; it has 'participating states' rather than Member 
States; and commitments made by those states are always made unanimously but binding 
only politically.11 Nevertheless, the OSCE's 'comprehensive' approach to regional security is 
built on three thematic pillars: politico-military; economic; and human 'dimensions' of 
security, each of which is considered equally important.12 In the human dimension, the OSCE 
recognises 'respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms' as one of its ten guiding 
principles and participant states have made and confirmed specific commitments, including 
directly on torture and other ill-treatment.13 The main OSCE institution responsible for the 
human dimension is the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). It 
was created by the 1990 Charter of Paris, and 'provides support, assistance and expertise to 
participating States and civil society to promote democracy, rule of law, human rights and 
tolerance and non-discrimination.'14 The ODIHR thus plays a significant role, mainly in 
capacity building and technical support. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore its 
work in greater detail, but for completeness, it should be noted.15 The institutional context in 
Europe is, therefore, complex to say the least. It offers a range of norms, institutions and 
approaches which engaged with the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment. In what follows 




<B>Council of Europe 
 
<C>Article 3 ECHR  
 
Article 3 of the ECHR comprises a single sentence:  
 'No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
 punishment.'  
 
Whilst this is an elegant formulation, it is not particularly illuminating regarding what it 
means in detail and in practice. The definition of the respective terms and the scope of the 
prohibition, for example the extent to which it applies extra-territorially, have necessarily 
been developed by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, and before its abolition in 1998 the 
European Commission on Human Rights. This is examined more closely in Section 5, but 
two key observations on the text can be made at this point. Firstly, unlike other instruments 
such as the CAT and the ICCPR, the wording of the prohibition in the EHCR does not refer 
directly to 'cruel' treatment. This should not be seen, and is not seen, as meaning that the 
                                                 
11 Steinbrock, M, Moser, M and Peters, A (eds), The Legal Framework of the OSCE (Cambridge University 
Press, 2019); Froehly, J P, ‘The OSCE 40 Years after Helsinki: Fall Back or Reset?’ (2016) 25 Polish Quarterly 
of International Affairs 7-21.   
12 Strohal, C, ‘Consolidation and New Challenges: The ODIHR in the OSCE's 30th Anniversary Year’ OSCE 
Yearbook (Baden-Baden, 2006). 
13 These are compiled in OSCE Human Dimension Commitments, Volume 1, Thematic Compilation ,3rd edn, 
(ODIHR, 2012). 
14 https://www.osce.org/odihr 
15 Notable work includes a handbook for practitioners outlining the OSCE's experience of prevention work, best 
practice and strategies: OSCE, The Fight Against Torture: the OSCE Experience (ODIHR, 2009), available at 
https://www.osce.org/odihr/37968?download=true. A recent example of the OSCE's technical support is 
advising Poland on its torture legislation, particularly on the definition of Torture see OSCE/ODIHR, Opinion 




ECHR prohibition is a weaker prohibition than its comparators elsewhere which do include 
this term. Instead, since torture and any other deliberately inflicted ill-treatment meeting the 
threshold of inhuman is also evidently cruel, a European interpretation would tend to see 
cruelty as being implicit in the prohibition.  
 
Secondly, and more crucially, Article 3 provides an absolute prohibition. The text is clear that 
'no one' shall be subjected to torture or ill-treatment, and this does not allow for any 
circumstances in which an exception might arise. The absolute nature of the prohibition is 
confirmed by Article 15(2) ECHR which is explicit that even in 'time of emergency 
threatening the life of the nation' there can be no derogation from Article 3. Neither is Article 
3 subject to any other restriction, qualification or balancing with competing rights claims or 
interests.16 This however, is as far as the text of Article 3 takes us - and the force of an 
absolute prohibition is compromised if there is a lack of clarity over either its content or its 
scope. It is the ECtHR, over many years, which has thrashed out this detail, returned to below 
in Section 5.  
 
<C>European Convention for the Prevention of Torture  
 
The European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (ECPT) entered into force on 1 February 1989. It established the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT), a non-judicial, preventive body, 
and introduced an approach to dealing with torture and ill-treatment that was nothing short of 
revolutionary at the time. It establishes a system of regular visits by the CPT, a regional inter-
disciplinary group of independent experts, to places of detention within the Member States. 
Based on those visits, and subsequent CPT reports and recommendations, an on-going 
relationship of dialogue between the CPT and states is developed as a means of combatting 
torture and ill-treatment, and more generally to improve the treatment and situation of people 
detained by the state. 
 
In addition to regular visits and on-going dialogue the system's central features are 
confidentiality17 and cooperation.18 It is not and was never designed to be adversarial. With 
its focus on prevention, it is forward looking: to 'strengthen... protection' and improve the 
situation of detainees. In ratifying the treaty, states grant the CPT permission to visit 'any 
place within its jurisdiction where persons are deprived of their liberty by a public 
authority'.19 Article 3 ECPT obligates the CPT and 'the competent national authorities' of 
Member States to co-operate', whilst Article 11 ECPT protects the confidentiality of 
'information gathered by the Committee in relation to a visit, its report and its consultations 
with the Party concerned'. Though almost all states publish the CPT's reports as a matter of 
                                                 
16 It has been observed the notion of absolute rights is nebulous, not being precisely defined in the case law and 
including assessment of subjective factors: Addo, M K, and Grief, N ‘Does Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Enshrine Absolute Rights?’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law 
510-524. It has elsewhere been argued Article 3 cannot be fully absolute. This is based argument that in (rare) 
situations where absolute rights clash, - such as one person's right to life with another's Article 3 right - a moral 
assessment should cause one person's right to yield to another's: Greer, S, ‘Is the prohibition against torture, 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment really 'absolute' in international human rights law?’ 
(2015) 15 Human Rights Law Review 101-37. For replies to this: Mavronicola, N, (2017) 15 Human Rights Law 
Review 479-98; Graffin, N, (2017) 15 Human Rights Law Review 681-99. Both were responded to by Greer in 
the same journal in 2018.  
17 ECPT, Article 11. 
18 ECPT, Article 3. 
19 ECPT, Article 2.  
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course (albeit it often with some considerable delay), the principle of confidentiality within 
the treaty affords space for open and honest discussion between the parties.   
 
The ECPT has never put forward definitions of torture or of inhuman or degrading treatment, 
the very things the CPT is mandated to prevent. As a non-judicial body, it is not within the 
CPT's mandate to do so (see below) and it has always been cautious not to stray into this area 
which rightly belongs to the ECtHR. Normatively, what the CPT has done is to offer a more  
concrete conception of preventive standards. Through its long experience of preventive 
visiting the CPT has developed such standards on numerous themes relating to the treatment 
of people in detention and the conditions in which they are held. This began with the CPT 
publishing thematic standards in its Annual Reports, but later the CPT published a repository 
of these standards both in copy and on its website.20 In reality, the standards are generally 
reformulations of recommendations made frequently to states, but they are nevertheless 
helpful in setting out the CPT's expectations and approach. More recently, the CPT has 
produced several 'Factsheets': on women in prison; immigration detention; and the transport 
of detainees. It has also published 'Checklists' for evaluation of, for example, of psychiatric 
hospitals.21     
 
<C>European Prison Rules 
 
The most prominent and impactful COE soft law instrument relevant to Article 3 ECHR is 
the 2006 European Prison Rules (EPR).22 Now in its third iteration, it has developed 
significantly since the first. That version in 1973, the (European) Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners, very closely mapped onto the 1953 version of the UN 
Standard Minimum Rules, with very little value added.23 They were revised in 1987, made 
more European, and renamed becoming the EPR. By more than one account, neither of these 
earlier versions was 'as influential as its authors may have hoped', partly because the CPT's 
reports gave greater detail24 and also because they were barely ever referred to in the ECHR 
jurisprudence. That said, in 2006 the CPT commented positively that previous versions had 
been influential.25 Reference to the EPR by the ECtHR and the CPT cannot be taken fully as 
evidence of their impact or importance, but is at least illustrative and the EPR are frequently 
referred to by both bodies. In 2016, 2017 and 2018 the EPR was referred to in respectively 
13, 6 and 6 ECtHR Article 3 cases,26 in many of which extracts from CPT reports had 
referred to the EPR.  
The 2006 EPR updated the previous version to reflect the ECHR, ECtHR jurisprudence and 
the CPT's work, particularly its standards.27 It is thus considered the 'most comprehensive 
modern European formulation' of state policy that should govern the administration of prison 
                                                 
20 https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/standards  
21 Ibid.  
22 Rec(2006)2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules (11 January 2006). 
23 Reynaud, A, Human Rights in Prisons (Council of Europe, 1983) cited in van Zyl Smit, D and Snacken, S, 
Principles of European Prison Law and Policy: Penology and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009).   
24 Van Zyl Smit and Snacken (n 23 above), 23.  
25 15th General Report on the CPT's Activities, CPT/Inf (2005) 17, para 49.  
26 Based on search of the ECtHR HUDOC search database.  
27 EPR, Preamble.  
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systems,28 and 'represent[s] a synthesis of many of the trends that preceded it.'29 With the 
purpose of ensuring respect for the human rights and dignity of prisoners,30 the EPR provides 
a high level of detail for a general document. It is organized thematically and opens by setting 
out some basic principles. In particular, '[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated 
with respect for their human rights' (Rule 1); they retain all rights that have not been removed 
'lawfully' (Rule 2); and any restrictions must be the 'minimum necessary and proportionate to 
the legitimate objective' (Rule 3). Moreover, lack of resources cannot justify conditions that 
'infringe prisoners' human rights' (Rule 4).  
Following the (nine) basic principles, the EPR addresses a number of core issues: conditions 
of imprisonment; health; good order; management and staff; inspection and monitoring; 
untried prisoners; and regime for sentenced prisoners. Each issue is divided into sub-themes: 
for example, Part II, concerning conditions of imprisonment, has various subsections 
including on the needs of specific groups: women, children and infants.  
Part II also has a subsection on 'admissions', which can be used to illustrate both the level of 
detail included in the EPR and their correlation with CPT (preventive) standards. The Rules 
outline what must be 'immediately' recorded 'at admission', including 'any visible injuries and 
complaints about prior ill-treatment'.31 Also 'at admission', the detainee should be given 
information including of their rights.32 'Immediately after admission' a third party should be 
informed,33 and 'as soon as possible' the prisoner should be examined by a medical 
practitioner.34 These safeguards accord strongly with CPT standards,  which present them as 
three of four fundamental rights that should be present from the outset of deprivation of 
liberty. Whilst the EPR does not in this subsection refer to the fourth of the CPT’s 
fundamental safeguards, access to a lawyer, this is addressed in Rule 23 concerning the 
provision of legal advice. Unlike CPT standards, Rule 23 does not indicate a timeframe for 
access to a lawyer, but the difference is contextual. The EPR apply to convicted prisoners or 
those remanded in custody by a judicial authority, that is, people in prisons. The CPT 
comparison drawn here is generally applied from the time of apprehension by the police. 
Indisputably, 'there is a high degree of consonance between the revised EPR and the 





<C>Charter of Fundamental Rights  
 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR),36 adopted 1999 and 
adapted in 2007, was originally a soft law instrument. It became legally binding only with the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU) in 2009.37 Article 6(1) TEU accords the CFR 
                                                 
28 Van Zyl Smit and Snacken (n 23), 87 
29 Ibid, 36 
30 EPR Preamble. (The 1987 draft refers to 'dignity', whereas the adopted version refers to 'human rights'). 
31 Rule 15.1 
32 Rule 15.2 with Rule 30. 
33 Rule 15.3 with Rule 24.9. 
34 Rule 16 (a) with Rule 42.1. 
35 15th General Report on the CPT's Activities, CPT/Inf (2005) 17, para 50.  
36 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01), Nice, 7 December 2000.  
37 Treaty of Lisbon (n 8 above). 
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the 'same legal value' as the EU Treaties, meaning its content is both binding on EU states 
and institutions and justiciable. The CJEU can therefore hear human rights cases. Article 6(2) 
obligates the EU to accede to the ECHR, and Article 6(3) states:  
 'Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
 Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [i.e. the ECHR] and as they result from the  
 constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
 principles of the Union’s law.'  
This is now especially important given the EU is unlikely to accede to the ECHR. There is a 
clear intention that there be coherence between the two systems. Notably, the CFR's content 
is primarily 'addressed to the institutions and bodies' of the EU and binds Member States 
'only when they are implementing Union law.'38 Hence, although the CFR covers a wider 
spectrum of rights than the ECHR, its impact governing the conduct of EU states is more 
limited. Consequently, emphasis remains with the COE and ECHR for rights common to both 
systems, and overlap regarding which treaty applies and which court has competence is 
mostly avoided.  
The danger of differing interpretations, scope and definitions being given to rights under the 
two respective frameworks is also mitigated by Article 52(3) CFR. Where rights under the 
CFR correspond with rights under the ECHR, 'the meaning and scope of those rights shall be 
the same as those laid down by' the ECHR. The prohibition of torture and inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment is one such right, and the corresponding Article 4 CFR 
and Article 3 ECHR have identical wording. Article 52(3) CFR adds that Union law may still 
provide 'more extensive protection', and indeed, the EU's position on the death penalty, 
considered never to be lawful, is an example. Nevertheless, it is the ECtHR which has 
through its extensive jurisprudence developed definitions and clarified the scope of the 




The EU's approach to the prohibition of torture through legislation and soft law has been 
outward-looking: directed towards the EU's interactions with third (non-EU) states, far more 
than looking inward on itself. This can be largely explained by measures having been taken 
under the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, and by the CFR's limited scope 
regarding EU states noted above. The key legislation is Regulation (EU) 2019/125 
concerning trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or 
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.39 This codifies a previous 2005 
Council Regulation,40 itself referred to as 'the Anti-Torture Regulation',41 and amendments to 
it, and is binding on all EU states. Regulation (EU) 2019/125 not only 'lays down Union rules 
governing trade' of such goods with third countries. It also sets 'rules governing the supply of 
brokering services, technical assistance, training and advertising related to such goods.'42  
                                                 
38 CFR (n 36 above), Article 51.  
39 Regulation (EU) 2019/125 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 January 2019 concerning 
trade in certain goods which could be used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (codification). 
40 Council Regulation (EC) No 1236/2005 of 27 June 2005 concerning trade in certain goods which could be 
used for capital punishment, torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
41 EU Commission: https://ec.europa.eu/fpi/what-we-do/anti-torture-measures_en  




An interesting feature of this Regulation is it that, unlike the CFR, (and of course the ECHR), 
it provides definitions. Although these definitions were intended to apply only narrowly to 
the Regulation, they are worth highlighting. Torture is defined by wording identical to Article 
1 of the UNCAT, with a single line addition at the end. Whereas the UNCAT definition ends 
by noting that torture 'does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or 
incidental to lawful sanctions', the EU Regulation adds that 'Capital punishment is not 
deemed a lawful penalty under any circumstances.'43 This puts a particularly European stamp 
on the definition of torture, and certainly makes clear the EU's stance as regards its 
relationship to the death penalty. This stance, it should be added, is consistent with that 
across the COE: all 47 states having abolished the death penalty in peacetime, most at all 
times.44 In 1989 the ECtHR indicated 'death row phenomenon' 'could give rise to' an Article 3 
ECHR violation,45 but strengthened its position in 2010 finding the mental suffering caused 
by fear of execution constitutes inhuman treatment, and hence the death penalty violates 
Article 3.46  
 
Perhaps surprisingly, Regulation (EU) 2019/125 also defines 'other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment'. This is unusual, not least because neither the UNCAT, 
the ECHR nor the CFR define these types of ill-treatment. The definition given however, is 
somewhat underwhelming and not especially helpful. It states:  
 ‘other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ means any act by which 
 pain or suffering attaining a minimum level of severity, whether physical or mental, is 
 inflicted on a person, when such pain or suffering is inflicted either by or at the
 instigation of, or with the consent or acquiescence of, a public official or other person 
 acting in an official capacity. It does not, however, include pain or suffering arising 
 only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful penalties. Capital punishment is not 
 deemed a lawful penalty under any circumstances'.47  
There is clearly no attempt to distinguish 'cruel', 'inhuman' or 'degrading' or to explain what, 
if anything, might set them apart. All this definition really says is these other forms of ill-
treatment must cause sufficiently severe pain or suffering to fall within their scope, and 
impliedly not be sufficiently severe to be considered as torture.48 This EU definition differs 
from the definition of torture also for its silence on the purposive element which under the 
UNCAT is required for there to be an act of torture. It could therefore be assumed for the 
Regulation's purposes that there need not be a purpose at all for this less severe, but ‘severe 
enough’ ill-treatment. However this reading is potentially problematic, since the definition 
indicates that ill-treatment is to be 'inflicted', which may suggest intention, though it is 
possible that there can be intention without purpose. The key point is that this inclusion does 
not suggest an especially developed or sophisticated understanding of what might be termed 
together 'other ill-treatment', yet claims to be a definition.  
                                                 
43 Ibid, Article 2(a).  
44 ECHR, Protocols 6 and 13. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia are the only states not to have ratified Protocol 
13 which completely abolishes the death penalty and allows no derogation.  
45 Soering v. the United Kingdom, 7 July 1989, Series A no 161, para 111. 
46 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. the United Kingdom, no 61498/08, ECHR 2010. 
47 Regulation (EU) 2019/125 (n 39 above), Article 2(b). 
48 Arguably this same approach is seen in UNCAT Article 16, but that provision does not purport to be a 
definition as such. 
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Although this definition is included for the purposes of the Regulation itself, it has the 
potential to mislead. For example, it is uncontested (and recognised also in the EU 
Guidelines, discussed below), that detention conditions are capable of amounting to inhuman 
and degrading treatment, but the Regulation is silent on this. Given the Regulation's specific 
focus on torture, it might have probably been better not to seek to define other forms of ill-
treatment at all.  
 
<C>EU Guidelines on torture and other cruel treatment  
 
In September 2019, the EU adopted new 'Guidelines to EU Policy towards third state 
countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment'49 (the 
Guidelines), revised from earlier versions in 2001, 2008 and 2012. This comprehensive and 
authoritative soft law document sets out the EU's approach to eradicating torture and ill-
treatment globally. Its purpose is to 'provide practical guidance to EU institutions and 
Member States, that can be used in their engagement with third countries as well as in 
multilateral human rights fora, to support ongoing efforts' to that end.50 The UNCAT, 
OPCAT and the relevant ECtHR jurisprudence 'form the basis of the EU's policy against 
torture and other ill-treatment',51 and the Guidelines are consistent with these, drawing also 
from international and regional standards and from the work of relevant bodies. Helpfully the 
Guidelines also clarify the EU's use of terminology, confirming its adoption of the UNCAT 
definition of torture, and that the definition of 'other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment ... 
should be in line with' ECtHR case-law and can include sub-standard detention conditions.52  
 
The Guidelines set out action to be taken by the EU towards the goal of eradicating torture 
and other ill-treatment and include a statement of the EU's policy approach. The EU's 
objective is 'to engage with third countries to take effective measures against torture and 
other ill-treatment to ensure that their absolute prohibition is enforced and that victims have 
access to rehabilitation services, legal support and other forms of reparation.'53 This is 'an 
integral part of [the EU's] human rights policy.' The EU takes a 'holistic and proactive 
approach' to the 'global eradication' of torture, 'including awareness-raising, education and 
training, prevention, monitoring and accountability, protection and redress, including 
rehabilitation for the victims of torture and other ill-treatment.'54 'EU Member States are 
determined to comply fully with international obligations prohibiting torture and other ill-
treatment'.55 'The EU encourages third countries to mainstream safeguards against torture and 
other ill-treatment.'56 It also 'promotes and supports' the work of National Human Rights 
Institutions and National Preventive Mechanisms under OPCAT.57  
 
After stating EU policy, the Guidelines give an overview of its practical support, - 'political 
and financial tools' - towards its objective. This includes political dialogue; monitoring, 
assessing and reporting; making statements; and even observing trials where it is believed the 
defendant or witnesses have been subjected to torture or ill-treatment. It is a highly detailed 
                                                 
49 EU Guidelines (n 7 above).  
50 Ibid, para 6.  
51 Ibid, para10.  
52 Ibid, para 9. 
53 Ibid, para 16.  
54 Ibid, para 17. 
55 Ibid, para 18. 
56 Ibid, para 18. 
57 Ibid, para 18. 
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statement of action with decisive undertakings that variously the 'EU', 'EU Delegations' and 
'EU Heads of Mission, etc. 'will' take.  
 
The EU's approach is 'comprehensive' and 'encompasses all essential elements to eradicate 
torture: prohibition, prevention, accountability and redress.'58 The 'operational section' of the 
Guidelines are arranged by these four themes and identify measures, 'important safeguards' 
the EU will 'urge and support third [non-EU] countries to take.' In this section also, the 
Guidelines offer an impressive level of detail. Not only are they consonant with other 
international and regional standards, they both reinforce and are bolstered by references to 
treaties, soft law, and reports. Space does not permit detailed engagement with these 
measures, suffice to say the 2019 revision is a significant rework of the previous version and 
arranged under the following themes: prohibit torture and other ill-treatment in law; reaffirm 
the absolute prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment in policy; comply with safeguards 
and procedures relating to detention; provide efficient and safe complaints mechanisms; 
allow efficient detention monitoring and oversight mechanisms; combat impunity; and 
provide redress for victims. It is authoritative, relevant and an invaluable tool towards the 
eradication of torture.  
 
<B>Some Comments on the Legal Framework 
 
The main thrust of EU law regarding the prohibition of torture is directed towards third 
states. Apart from the CFR itself, which is only binding on EU states when they are 
implementing EU law, there is little which looks to the practice of EU states themselves. 
There is no document for example, setting out expectations on EU states to meet their 
obligations under Article 4 CFR. It would require no leap of the imagination for this to be 
understood as including those set out in the Guidelines, but it is unlikely that all EU states 
would choose to do so unless expressly required. EU states have been responsible for a 
considerable number of violation findings under Article 3 ECHR, including 27 findings for 
torture in the years to 1959-2018.59 In the same period, Romania and Greece have been in 
held in violation for (substantively) inhuman and degrading treatment in 263 and 115 cases 
respectively. Moreover, the Guidelines call for third states to criminalize torture whilst it is 
well known that Italy only did so in July 2017, and this through legislation that many have 
deemed inadequate.60 It is also notable that not all EU states are prepared to extradite 
suspects to other EU states. For example, certain states routinely refuse to extradite to Greece 
and Romania because of the detention conditions in those states.61 Following a decision in its 
Supreme Court, Denmark has refused to extradite suspects to Romania on this basis.62 In 
May 2019, the Netherlands refused to return a prisoner to the UK considering prison 
conditions where he would likely end up 'inhumane'.63  
It is absolutely correct, indeed necessary, that the EU puts pressure on third states to eradicate 
                                                 
58 Ibid, para 4. 
59 Violator states: Austria (1); Belgium (1); Bulgaria (1); France (2); Greece (1); Italy (9); Netherlands (1); 
Poland (2); Romania (2); Slovak Republic (1); Sweden (1); United Kingdom (2). For a statistical breakdown of 
violations see: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Stats_violation_1959_2018_ENG.pdf 
60 https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/11/italys-new-law-torture-fails-meet-international-standards 
61 Statistics on European Arrest Warrants, including their refusal are available at: https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_european_arrest_warrant-90--maximize-en.do 
62 Council of the European Union, Replies to questionnaire on quantitative information on the practical 





torture and ill-treatment using such tools as the Guidelines and Regulation (EU) 2019/125. At 
the same time, more needs to be done by the EU and by EU states to get their own houses in 
order. Currently, this is addressed neither by soft law nor legislation by the EU. It is, 
however, clear from the manner in which the EU has striven for compatibility with the ECHR 
that the main source of normative guidance for the EU and member states regarding the 
prohibition and prevention of torture will in practice derive from the COE, and from which it 




This Section introduces the principal institutions in Europe whose work is relevant to the 
prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment. The intention is to give a flavour of what each 
does and the contribution they make. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to explain and 
examine all aspects of each institution in detail. The intention is to show, through its various 
institutions, how the European region is equipped to address the prohibition. Institutional 
responses are not only reactive but also proactive, including directly through preventive 
visiting and financial and technical assistance. In the drive to eradicate torture and ill-
treatment in Europe, two institutions are key: the ECtHR and the CPT.  
 
 
<B>Council of Europe 
 
<C>European Court of Human Rights  
 
The ECtHR's role extends beyond determining accountability for Article 3 violations. Its 
jurisprudence (for which see the following section) is instrumental in determining the scope 
and content of the prohibition not only for the purposes of the ECHR, but also the CFR. 
 
The ECtHR derives its mandate from the ECHR, as amended by Protocols 11 and 14, and has 
jurisdiction to 'consider all matters concerning the interpretation and application' of the 
ECHR and its protocols.64 It may receive inter-state applications, these being a claim by a 
state party that another has acted in breach of its Convention obligations.65 It may also 
receive individual applications 'from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation' by an ECHR state.66 Inter-state 
applications are relatively rare, though they are becoming less so.67 As regards Article 3, 
however, the foundations of the ECHR’s approach are rooted in two early inter-state 
applications, the Greek case68 and Ireland v UK,69 discussed below. Individual applications 
form the overwhelming majority of cases considered by the ECtHR.70 Most applications are 
                                                 
64 ECHR, Article 32.  
65 ECHR, Article 33. 
66 ECHR, Article 34 
67 There have been 24 inter-state applications since 1953. Of these, eight applications were made since 2014 
(three in 2018). A further three applications were made between 2007-9: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/InterState_applications_ENG.pdf  See also: Ulfstein, G and Risini, I, 
‘Inter-state applications under the European Convention on Human Rights: strengths and challenges’ EJILTalk, 
24 January 2020: https://www.ejiltalk.org/author/gulfstein/   
68 Netherlands v. Greece, Report of 18 November 1969, 1969 12 Yearbook 1 (The Greek case). 
69 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Series A no 25. 
70 On 31 December 2019 there the ECtHR had 59,800 pending cases, almost all individual applications. ECtHR 
Statistics: https://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=reports&c=  
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rejected on preliminary grounds, but cases considered on the merits are usually decided by a 
Chamber of 7 judges but exceptionally, although not infrequently, might be considered by a 
'Grand Chamber' composed of 17 judges.  
 
The ECtHR has a very high case load and many of the applications are 'repetitive cases'71 
deriving from 'a common dysfunction at the national level'. To address this, the ECtHR has 
developed a 'pilot judgment procedure',72 by which, when there are several applications with 
the same root cause, it may select one or more to prioritise. The ECtHR will then decide the 
immediate case before it and at the same time identify the underlying structural issues giving 
rise to repeat cases, and indicate to the state in question 'the type of remedial measures 
needed to resolve it.'73 The ECtHR can then choose to adjourn ('freeze') similar pending cases 
(it may also reinstate them if not satisfied by the State’s response) and so reduce its caseload. 
This means that, in effect if not in by design, the ECtHR now has a preventive dimension to 
its work.  
 
To date, there have been five pilot judgments concerning Article 3 ECHR, all in respect of 
inhuman or degrading treatment. Four of these have related to structural problems within the 
respective states - Russia, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary - causing inadequate detention 
conditions in prisons,74 the fifth, to structural inadequacies in the Belgian psychiatric 
detention system.75 Of the prison cases, the Court has decided at present not to adjourn 
similar cases from its pending list concerning Russia, Bulgaria or Hungary until appropriate 
measures are fully implemented. The potential benefits of the pilot judgment approach are 
illustrated by Torreggiani v Italy, concerning severe overcrowding due to 'chronic 
dysfunction' in the prison system and which had resulted in 'several hundred' similar pending 
applications. The ECtHR directed Italy to put in place effective and appropriate measures to 
address prison overcrowding within one year of its decision becoming final, during which 
time it adjourned similar pending cases. In response Italy made legislative changes and 
introduced a compensation scheme. The ECtHR has since indicated its view that, in principle, 
these measures should afford appropriate relief.76  
 
Two further aspects of the ECtHR's general approach to Article 3 ECHR should be noted. 
First, the ECtHR distinguishes between 'substantive' and 'procedural' dimensions of the 
prohibition, distinguishing between the question of whether (substantively) there has been 
torture or ill-treatment, or whether (procedurally) there has been a failure to fully investigate 
allegations or to safeguard. This maps onto the second point. The ECtHR is more than willing 
to make 'strong inferences' of fact and to reverse the burden of proof,77 and it frequently does 
so. The ECtHR is not a court of first instance and in most of the cases it hears the facts are 
                                                 
71 In January 2019 there were 57,250 such cases, Court Pilot Judgment Factsheet, January 2019: 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Pilot_judgments_ENG.pdf  
72 See generally: Leach, P, Hardman, H, Stephenson, S and Blitz, B, Responding to Systemic Human Rights 
Violations: An Analysis of “Pilot Judgment”' of the European Court of Human Rights and Their Impact at 
National Level (Intersentia, 2010). 
73 Pilot Judgment Factsheet (n 71 above). 
74 Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos 42525/07 and 60800/08, 10 January 2012; Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, 
nos 43517/09, 46882/09, 55400/09, 57875/09, 61535/09, 35315/10 and 37818/10, 8 January 2013; Neshkov and 
Others v. Bulgaria, nos 36925/10 and 5 others, 27 January 2015; Varga and Others v. Hungary, nos 14097/12, 
45135/12, 73712/12, 34001/13, 44055/13. 
and 64586/13, 10 March 2015.  
75 W.D. v. Belgium, no 73548/13, 6 September 2016.   
76 Pilot Judgment Factsheet (n 71 above). 
77 Ireland v United Kingdom (n 69 above).  
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already fully established. However, torture and ill-treatment, which can include 
disappearances, are invariably strongly contested by the respondent state to the point that 
state denial can be considered a defining aspect of them.78 Rightly or wrongly, the ECtHR 
applies the high 'beyond reasonable doubt' standard of proof.79 However, while it may 
already be possible for the ECtHR to find a violation on the procedural grounds, that, for 
example, the state has not adequately investigated allegations of ill-treatment, the application 
need not necessarily fail on the substantive question due to a lack of evidence due to the 
possibility of reversing the burden of proof in appropriate cases.80     
 
 
<C>Committee for the Prevention of Torture  
 
The CPT and its work were briefly introduced above.81 This section provides an overview of 
the CPT's general approach to its mandate and its use of key terminology.  
 
The CPT's function, as its full name suggests, is preventive. It is an independent, non-judicial 
and multi-disciplinary body of experts mandated  
 ' by means of visits, [to] examine the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty 
 with a view to strengthening, if necessary, the protection of such persons from torture 
 and from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.'82 
Preventive visiting is thus central to the CPT's mandate. By ratifying the ECPT, all COE 
Member states agree to allow and accommodate the CPT's visits, which may be announced or 
unannounced. This means allowing the CPT to enter the country and to have unrestricted and 
immediate access to, and circulation within, any place of detention in the state, including the 
ability to speak privately with detainees and others who consent, and being provided with any 
information it requests which is relevant to the exercise of its mandate. Visits are regular, and 
the CPT aims to make an announced ('periodic') visit to every member state roughly once 
every four to five years, although in reality there is some variation from this, in part because 
of the differing size of the countries and of the detained populations. Periodic visits are 
generally for two weeks, during which the CPT visits a range of detention types including 
police custody, remand centres and prisons in the criminal justice sector, as well as 
immigration detention, psychiatric and social care facilities. Unannounced ('ad hoc') visits are 
shorter in duration but focussed to a particular problem area identified in the state. 
The CPT's country visits form the basis of an on-going dialogue between the Committee and 
the state. During a visit, and even during its preparation phase, the CPT is attentive to legal 
and other safeguards against torture and other ill-treatment, the treatment of detainees, 
detention conditions and regime in the state in question. A visit usually begins with the 
delegation meeting with high-level officials and separately with Civil Society Organisations  
before the main part of the visit: going into institutions, meeting and talking with detainees, 
                                                 
78 Keller, H and Heri, C, ‘Enforced Disappearance and the European Court of Human Rights: A “Wall of 
Silence”: Fact-Finding difficulties and States as “Subversive Objectors”’ (2014) 12 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 735  
79 Compare the Human Rights Committee which applies the balance of probabilities. See Chapter seven of this 
volume.   
80 Bicknell, C, ‘Uncertain Certainty? Making Sense of the European Court of Human Rights' Standard of Proof’ 
(2019) 8 International Human Rights Law Review 1.  
81 For a detailed study of the CPT see Bicknell, C, Evans, M and Morgan, R, Preventing Torture in Europe 
(Council of Europe, 2018). 
82 ECPT, Article 1.  
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staff and other interested parties, especially in confidential interviews, looking at registers 
and records and generally building a picture of the practical experience of detention within 
the facility in question. On completion of a visit, the CPT adopts and transmits a report to the 
state authorities, including its recommendations to improve the situation of detained people. 
States are expected to take positive steps in light of the CPT's findings and recommendations. 
Frequently, visit reports include 'immediate observations', which are points the CPT 
highlights as high priority, often giving the state a short time-frame within which to address 
or at least to reply to them. Article 10(2) ECPT also allows the CPT to issue a 'Public 
Statement' where the state is not cooperating. The CPT has only eight times made such 
statements, and they should be considered the end point of a process, but which can by 
themselves be sufficient to cause a state to adjust its behaviour. In accordance with the ECPT, 
the reports and all relevant discussion between the CPT and the state are confidential. Most 
states do however, authorise the CPT to publish its visit reports and their responses to them,83 
albeit often with some considerable delay.     
 
Because of its specific mandate, the CPT does not work with fixed definitions of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment and avoids applying these labels to situations: it is a non-
judicial body and that is the ECtHR's domain. The CPT is also categorically not a fact-
finding arm of the ECtHR. Its role - through visits and cooperative dialogue with states to 
prevent torture and ill-treatment - would be undermined were that the case, whilst the 
preventive dimension of its work means it is not oriented towards accountability through the 
ECtHR. This said, as both are COE bodies with Article 3 ECHR as their common reference 
point, their work inevitably intersects and relationships have matured to a point at which they 
now work synergistically, often referring to and reinforcing the findings or work of the 
other.84  
 
The CPT has developed a 'non-judicial approach to labelling'85 in order to distance itself 
somewhat from the language of Article 3 ECHR. Firstly, the CPT always refers to 
'allegations'. Whilst it often qualifies allegations as being credible or consistent with recorded 
injuries, it never reports ill-treatment as an established fact. Secondly, instead of using the 
terms 'torture', 'inhuman' or 'degrading', to describe reported mistreatment, the CPT usually 
refers to 'ill-treatment,' an overarching term a step removed from the language of the ECHR. 
The CPT will again usually qualify this with some indication of the severity or intentionality 
of the ill-treatment, for example 'severe', 'deliberate' or 'serious'. Finally, when the CPT does 
use the terms 'torture', 'inhuman' or 'degrading' it again introduces a form of qualified 
distancing, most commonly the formulations x treatment 'could be considered to be' or 'could 
be considered as amounting to' torture, etc. It is probable that in such cases the CPT has 
formed its own view of the nature of the treatment it is describing. It nevertheless approaches 
the wording cautiously in its reports and accompanies it with detailed factual accounts of the 
basis of its impression.  
 
<C>Commissioner for Human Rights  
 
                                                 
83 See https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/home 
84 Bicknell, Evans, and Morgan (n 81 above). 
85 Ibid, 73-78.  
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The office of Commissioner for Human Rights was established in 1999 by a Resolution of 
the COE Committee of Ministers.86 The Commissioner is an impartial and independent87 
non-judicial institution with a mandate to 'promote education in, awareness of and respect for 
human rights' in COE states.88 This includes promoting 'the effective observance and full 
enjoyment' of human rights; facilitating the activities of national human rights institutions; 
giving advice and information on human rights protection and prevention; and identifying 
shortcomings in member states.89 Whenever the Commissioner deems it appropriate, she may 
address a report to the Committee of Ministers or also to the Parliamentary Assembly.90 The 
Commissioner must cooperate with international institutions for the promotion and protection 
of human rights while avoiding unnecessary duplication of activities.91 In its awareness 
raising and thematic work the office cooperates with other COE bodies and with 'a broad 
range' of international institutions including specialised UN offices, the EU and the OSCE. 
The Commissioner cooperates also with national human rights institutions, NGOs, 
universities and think-tanks.92  
 
As a non-judicial office, the Commissioner does not decide individual complaints, though it is 
her office's role to be informed and to build a better understanding of human rights issues 
within COE countries as well as issues of thematic concern. Accordingly, the 'Commissioner 
may act on any relevant information' which might come from governments, national 
parliaments, national ombudsmen, individuals or organisations,93 and the Commissioner can 
issue recommendations, opinions and reports.94 
 
The Commissioner's work is divided into three main areas: country visits, including dialogue 
with state authorities and civil society; thematic reporting and advising on human rights 
implementation; and awareness-raising. Although the office has not yet published thematic 
work specifically concerning torture and ill-treatment, many of the themes explored have a 
bearing upon it, such as children's rights; counter-terrorism; LGBTI; migration; and persons 
with disabilities.95  
 
Issues concerning Article 3 are also a prominent feature of the Commissioner's country 
specific work, which includes publishing relevant 'issue papers' (reports), acting as third party 
intervenor in ECtHR cases, country visits, issuing statements and written letters to heads of 
government that the situation is being monitored and urging specific action. For example, the 
mass influx of migrants to Europe fleeing persecution and war has created a crisis in Europe 
and placed acute pressure particularly on first port of entry states. The Commissioner 
undertook a country visit to Greece in October 2019 following which she made a statement 
                                                 
86 Resolution (99) 50 on the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 7 May 1999 at its 104th Session). 
87 Ibid, Article 2.  
88 Ibid, Article1 and 3(a). 
89 Ibid, Article 3. 
90 Ibid, Article f. 
91 Ibid, Article 3 (i). 
92 https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/mandate 
93 Resolution (n 87) Article 5.  
94 Ibid, Article 8.  
95 For example, the Commissioner has published papers on corporal punishment of children: Children and 
Corporal Punishment: "the right not to be hit, also a children's right" CommDH/IssuePaper(2006)1; juvenile 
justice: Children and Juvenile Justice: Proposals for Improvements CommDH/IssuePaper(2009)1; and the right 




that the situation that had 'dramatically worsened' over the previous year and called on 
Greece to urgently transfer asylum seekers from the Aegean islands and improve living 
conditions in reception centres.96 When Italy introduced legislation affecting the rights of 
refugees, asylum seekers and migrants, the Commissioner wrote a letter to the Italian Prime 
Minister expressing concern, including over measures 'hampering and criminalising the work 
of NGOs who play a crucial role in saving lives at sea, banning disembarkation in Italian 
ports, and relinquishing responsibility for search and rescue operations to authorities which 
appear unwilling or unable to protect rescued migrants from torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment.'97 Following up on a letter sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina in May 2018,98 the 
Commissioner issued a statement calling for the urgent relocation of migrants who were 
being held in overcrowded, 'deplorable' conditions in an improvised camp without running 
water or electricity and poor sanitation.99   
 
This is just a snap-shot of the Commissioner's work in one thematic area which demonstrates 




<C>Court of Justice of the EU  
 
The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has jurisdiction to hear claims invoking the CFR. The 
CJEU case law relating to the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Article 4 CFR) is far more limited than the ECtHR's (on corresponding Article 3 
ECHR) for at least three reasons. Firstly, the CFR binds EU states 'only when they are 
implementing Union law.' Secondly, the CFR has only been legally binding since 2009. 
Thirdly, since the ECtHR is exclusively focussed on human rights and very well established 
it is the main point of reference for litigants. There have, nevertheless, been more Article 4 
cases than might first be expected, particularly in respect of non-refoulement for asylum 
seekers and under the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) scheme, of which the latter is the 
most revelatory. 
 
Recently, in Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu v Geralstaatsanwaltschaft Hamburg,100 the CJEU's 
Grand Chamber made a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 4 CFR and 
legislation applicable to the EAW101 which, on the face of it, conflict. In summary, EAW is a 
mechanism by which suspects connected with significant crimes may be arrested and 
subsequently extradited from one EU state (the 'executing state') to another (the 'issuing 
state'). It is based on EU principles of 'mutual trust' and 'mutual recognition', meaning that, 
'save in exceptional circumstances, EU states must consider all the other Member States to be 
complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU 
                                                 
96 https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/greece-must-urgently-transfer-asylum-seekers-from-the-aegean-
islands-and-improve-living-conditions-in-reception-facilities 




100 Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu v Geralstaatsanwaltschaft Hamburg, Case C-128/18, Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber), 15 October 2019. 
101 Namely, Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and 
the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ 2002 L 190, p. 1), as amended by Council Framework 
Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 February 2009 (OJ 2009 L 81, p. 24) (‘Framework Decision 2002/584’). 
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law.'102 Additionally, 'save in exceptional cases', they may not check whether another EU 
state has 'actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
European Union.'103 At the same time, Article 4 CFR must be interpreted as having 'the same 
meaning and scope' as Article 3 ECHR,104 which provision will not allow extradition or 
return to a receiving state where there is a 'real risk' of torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. Herein lies the problem, which has been known for quite some 
time105 but not fully resolved: not all EU states are compliant and a 'real risk' may exist. 
Indeed, it was noted above that extraditions including to Greece, Romania and the UK have 
been refused on this basis.   
 
The same difficulty arose when Romania issued a request to Germany, which led to the 
German Courts seeking a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu 
shines real light on the relationship between the ECHR and EU law. Although divided into a 
series of specific sub-questions, Germany asked two overarching questions, which put 
broadly were: (a). under Framework Decision 2002/584 (i.e. the EAW) what are the 
minimum standards for custodial conditions required by Article 4 CFR, including whether 
there is an "absolute" minimum cell size requirement and whether and how cell size can be 
mitigated, and (b) What standards are to be used to assess whether conditions comply with 
fundamental rights, including how comprehensive an assessment of custodial conditions in 
the issuing state (Romania) is permitted, namely were the German courts in this case limited 
to an "examination as to manifest errors"?  
 
The judgment considers these questions together and the CJEU expressly confirmed that 
Article 4 CFR corresponds with Article 3 ECHR, including the 'meaning and scope' of the 
right as determined by ECtHR case law as well as the text.106 The CJEU's examination of 
personal space is notable for its fidelity to the ECtHR position, particularly that set out in 
Mursic v Croatia.107 Regarding the extent and scope of the review of custodial conditions in 
the issuing state, the absolute nature of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment means that 
more is required than a superficial assessment limited to 'obvious inadequacies.'108 The 
review is to 'determine, specifically and precisely' whether there is a real risk to the person 
whose extradition has been sought,109 hence authorities in the executing state are 'solely 
required to assess' prisons (and temporary facilities) where that individual would, according 
to the issuing state, be detained.110 However, and perhaps controversially,  
 'When the assurance that the person concerned will not suffer inhuman or degrading 
 treatment on account of the actual and precise conditions of his detention, irrespective 
 of the prison in which he is detained in the issuing Member State, has been given, 
 ...the executing judicial authority must rely on that assurance, at least in the absence 
 of any specific indications that the detention conditions in a particular detention 
 centre are in breach of Article 4 of the Charter.'111 
                                                 
102 Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu v Geralstaatsanwaltschaft Hamburg (n 100 above), para 46.  
103 Ibid, para 47. 
104 Ibid, para 47.  
105 For example: Justice, European Arrest Warrants: Ensuring an effective defence (Justice, 2012).  
106 Ibid, para 58.  
107 Muršić v. Croatia [GC], no. 7334/13, 20 October 2016. See also Bicknell, Evans and Morgan (n 81 above) 
35-6.   
108 Dumitru-Tudor Dorobantu v Geralstaatsanwaltschaft Hamburg (n 100 above), para 62.  
109 Ibid, para 63.  
110 Ibid, para 66.  




Accordingly, the CJEU anticipates that 'only in exceptional circumstances' will there be a 
'real risk' and a request be refused. This approach seeks to maintain as far as possible the 
mutual recognition principle and harmony between EU states, whilst ensuring against 
'pockets of impunity' within the EU. However, since some EU states do not necessarily meet 
an acceptable ECHR/CFR-compliant baseline, whilst this approach may well protect the 
particular individual in question, its overall impact is limited. It would be far bolder and send 
a much stronger message politically and preventively to block extradition where detention 





The Fundamental Rights Agency was created in 2007 and has produced important work 
helping embed a rights-based culture across the EU. Similar to the COE's Commissioner for 
Human Rights, the FRA works on themes, many of which intersect with Article 4 CFR, 
including asylum, migration and borders; LGBTI; hate crime; racism; rights of the child; 
Roma; and people with disabilities. It engages in research to identify and understand issues as 
well as best practices to resolve them. It assists EU institutions and states and offers 
significant practical guidance. Examples of relevant work produced by the FRA include: a 
manual for fundamental rights-based police training;112 continuously reporting, reminding 
and keeping pressure on EU states about the extent of human suffering at immigration 
reception centres113; and participating in expert meetings convened for example on the theme 
of responding to violence against children.   
 
 
<A>ECtHR JURISPRUDENCE: DEFINITIONS AND SCOPE OF ARTICLE 3 ECHR 
 
The ECtHR's jurisprudence plays a fundamental defining role through which the scope and 
content of the Article 3 ECHR prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment are clarified as well as implemented. This is important for the COE and equally 
for the EU, particularly its institutions which are not already bound by the ECHR, since 
Article 4 CFR corresponds Article 3 ECHR and the EU has to date, readily adopted the 
ECtHR's interpretation. Therefore, the ECtHR Article 3 jurisprudence carries significant 
authoritative weight across both systems. 
 
The ECHR is recognised as a 'living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions', meaning:  
 'certain acts which were classified in the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” 
 as opposed to “torture” could be classified differently in future. It [the ECtHR] takes 
 the view that the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the 
 protection of human rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably 
 requires greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of 
 democratic societies.'114 
 




114 Selmouni v France [GC], no 25803/94, ECHR 1999-V, para 101.  
 
 19 
Consequently, the ECtHR's understanding of acts prohibited under Article 3 have changed 
over time and will almost certainly continue to do so. Additional uncertainties mean that even 
when the facts are established it can often be difficult to predict whether the ECtHR will find 
the acts, circumstances or conditions in question violate Article 3, or how they will be 







Perhaps surprisingly, it was not until the case of Aksoy v Turkey in 1996 that the ECtHR first 
determined that an act of torture had taken place.116 The general approach to torture and ill-
treatment under Article 3 had, however, been set out in two earlier cases which considered 
what sets 'torture' apart from 'inhuman' and/or 'degrading' treatment or punishment. Since 
Aksoy, findings of torture have become far more frequent as the ECtHR has matured and 
grown in confidence. Its approach to the terms is something of a blend between its two earlier  
positions and subsequent development and now appears to be very much more aligned with 
the UNCAT definition which emphasises the relevance of the purpose as well as the  severity 
of deliberately inflicted ill-treatment.   
 
Article 3 was first considered in the Greek case, where the Commission117 attempted to 
differentiate the prohibition's key elements. 
'It is plain that there may be treatment to which all these descriptions apply, for all torture 
must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and all inhuman treatment also degrading. 
The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as deliberately causes 
severe suffering, mental or physical, which in the particular situation is unjustifiable. The 
word “torture” is often used to describe inhuman treatment which has a purpose such as 
the obtaining of information or confessions, or the infliction of punishment, and it is 
generally an aggravated form of inhuman or degrading treatment. Treatment or 
punishment of an individual may be said to be degrading if it grossly humiliates him 
before others or drives him to act against his will or conscience.'118 
 
The statement became discredited because of the unfortunate implicit suggestion that the 
deliberate infliction of severe mental or physical suffering might in some situations be 
justifiable. Categorically, it cannot be, and the ECtHR's case law has since stated the absolute 
nature of the prohibition in no uncertain terms.119 This false start aside,120 the basic approach 
remains one in which torture is 'often' inhuman treatment which is inflicted for a purpose, and 
'generally' an 'aggravated' form of inhuman treatment. It remains true that the ECtHR has 
always looked for an aggravating factor which, in the Greek case was the presence of 
purpose.121 
 
                                                 
115 Bicknell, Evans and Morgan (n 81 above) 63.  
116 Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI. 
117 Now defunct.  
118 (n 68). 
119 Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no 22978/05, ECHR 2010, para 107. This is not withstanding nuanced arguments 
in the literature noted above (n 16 above). 
120 The Commission itself did so in Ireland v. the United Kingdom (Report, paras 388-90) in 1976. See also 
Rodley, N S, ‘The Definition(s) of Torture in International Law’ (2002) 55 Current Legal Problems 467-493.  
121 Bicknell, Evans and Morgan (n 81 above) 64-67.  
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In Ireland v UK122 the ECtHR again recognized the importance of purpose,123 but took the 
position that because a 'special stigma' attaches to torture it must attain a greater level of 
severity than other ill-treatment. In consequence, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment 
have long been understood as comprising a sliding scale,  with the level of severity determining 
how the ill-treatment should be categorized. The severity was also contingent on the 
characteristics of the victim, including sex, age, and state of health. Severity, however, is no 
longer quite so central. Indeed, Aksoy itself indicated the relevance of both severity and purpose 
to a finding of torture, and more recent cases tend to take both elements together as 
determinants of categorization.124 Context also increasingly plays a role in the ECtHR's 
assessment of what labels to apply. But, it is argued, particularly based on the Greek case, that 
purpose itself is capable of being the aggravating factor which can render what would otherwise 
be inhuman treatment into an act of torture without the need for it to be ‘more’ severe.125  
 
  
<C>Inhuman Treatment and/or Degrading Treatment  
 
The 'scale of severity' approach based on where along a continuum of severity particular ill-
treatment fits is perceptible in the jurisprudence.126 The ECtHR frequently refers to 'inhuman 
and degrading' together without differentiating between them, as if  this were a single 
category in its own right.  However, there has relatively recently been a shift in approach, 
with the ECtHR considering degrading treatment alone, linking it with human dignity and 
introducing a subjective dimension. According to the Grand Chamber in Kudła v. Poland 
degrading treatment 'is such to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority 
capable of humiliating and debasing them'.127  
 
The Grand Chamber in Bouyid v. Belgium emphasised that human dignity lies at the core of 
the Article 3 prohibition, a link 'particularly strong' with degrading treatment.128 The 
judgment illustrates the ECtHR's broad approach. Firstly, whether ill-treatment is degrading 
includes objective and subjective elements. All ill-treatment must be of a minimum level of 
severity to engage Article 3 and this, Bouyid confirms, 'usually involves actual bodily injury 
or intense physical or mental suffering.' Even without it,  
 'where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for or 
 diminishing his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or 
 inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance, it may 
 be characterised as degrading and also fall within the prohibition set forth in Article 
 3'.129 
 
What distinguishes this from inhuman treatment or torture in this case is the severity of 
suffering, which must be 'serious physical or mental suffering' in these latter categories.  
Hence, torture and inhuman treatment may be distinguished from each other based on 
severity and the presence or absence of purpose, whilst degrading treatment is distinguishable 
based on severity.  
                                                 
122 Ireland v. United Kingdom (n 69 above). 
123 Ibid, para167.  
124 See for example Ateşoğlu v. Turkey, no 53645/10, 20 January 2015, para 20; also Süreyya Eren v. Turkey, no 
36617/07, 20 October 2015, para 35. 
125 Bicknell, Evans and Morgan (n 81 above) 64-67. 
126 E.g. Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1993, Series A no 247-C. 
127 Kudła v. Poland [GC], no 30210/96, ECHR 2000-XI, para 92. 
128 Bouyid v. Belgium [GC], no 23380/09, ECHR 2015, para 81 and 90.  






Article 3 imposes a negative duty that states must not commit acts of torture or ill-treatment, 
and also imposes positive obligations on ECHR Member states.130 In particular, there is the 
duty to undertake an effective investigation for alleged violations, for which failure results in 
a procedural violation even where a substantive violation cannot be established. 
Investigations need to be 'conducted independently, promptly and with reasonable 
expedition.' When appropriate (and it is not always possible, e.g. disappearance cases), the 
'victim should be able to participate effectively.' In principle, the investigation should be 
'capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and 
punishment of those responsible.'131 There are many cases in which such procedural failings 
are found.  
 
Positive obligations under Article 3 are not exclusively procedural. The state may have a duty 
to protect against the acts of private individuals. If ill-treatment by private parties is with the 
'acquiescence or connivance' of the state authorities this 'may engage the State's responsibility 
under the Convention.'132 Even without acquiescence safeguards need to be in place. For 
example, in  O'Keeffe v Ireland, concerning the sexual abuse of a child in a non-state primary 
school, the Grand Chamber made clear 'the content of the positive obligation to protect' 
connotes 'effective measures of deterrence against [such] grave acts' and 'can only be 
achieved by the existence of effective criminal-law provisions backed up by law-enforcement 
machinery.'133 Safeguards in this case needed to include 
 'at a minimum ... effective mechanisms for the detection and reporting of any ill-
 treatment by and to a State-controlled body, such procedures being fundamental to the 
 enforcement of the criminal laws, to the prevention of such ill-treatment and, more 
 generally therefore, to the fulfilment of the positive protective obligation of the 





As under other systems, the ECHR prohibition of torture and ill-treatment includes the 
principle of  non-refoulement: that a person may not be extradited or otherwise returned to a 
third state if, once there, they might be ill-treated.135 Under Article 3 ECHR the principle 
applies when there are 'substantial grounds' for believing there is a 'real risk' to the individual 
if returned.136 This principle has already been discussed in respect of the EAW above, and 
applies equally to irregular migrants and/or failed asylum seekers, as indeed anyone else 
being extradited or deported. The burden of proving the risk falls to the applicant. However, 
                                                 
130 For a detailed study of positive obligations see Lavrysen, L, Human Rights in a Positive State (Insentia, 
2016).  
131 O’Keeffe v. Ireland [GC], no 35810/09, ECHR 2014 (extracts), para 172. 
132 Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no 48787/99, ECHR 2004-VII, para 318, referring to Cyprus 
v. Turkey [GC], no 25781/94, ECHR 2001-IV, para 81.  
133 O’Keeffe v. Ireland (n 131 above), para 148. 
134 Ibid, para 162.  
135 For insight into the ECtHR's views see  'Non-refoulement as a principle of international law and the role of 
the judiciary in its implementation' (Council of Europe, 2017): 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Dialogue_2017_ENG.pdf  
136 Soering v. United Kingdom (n 45 above); Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 1996-V. 
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the ECtHR recognises the difficulty this presents for asylum seekers and J.K. v Sweden sets 
out very clearly its approach.137  
 
First, 'real risk' is objectively evaluated, and must be 'assessed primarily with reference to 
those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the 
time of expulsion'.138 Second, the risk need not be of ill-treatment perpetrated by the state: the 
'absolute character' of the prohibition139 dictates that Article 3 protects also against non-state 
actors in this context. Third, the burden of proof is on the applicant, but for asylum seekers it 
is 'frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when assessing the credibility' 
of statements and documents. 
 'As a general rule, an asylum-seeker cannot be seen as having discharged the burden 
 of proof until he or she provides a substantiated account of an individual, and thus a 
 real, risk of ill-treatment upon deportation that is capable of distinguishing his or her 
 situation from the general perils in the country of destination.'140 
  
Additionally,  individual factors  which on their own might not suggest a real risk must be 
considered cumulatively and, taken together, may meet the threshold.141 Finally, although not 
decisive, past ill-treatment 'may be relevant for assessing the level of risk of future ill-
treatment'. J.K. notably shows synergy with the EU Qualification Directive and UNCHR 
documents in making this point, citing Article 4(4) of the Directive directly: 
 '[t]he fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm, or 
 direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the 
 applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, 
 unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will 




Under Article 1 ECHR states parties must 'secure to everyone within their jurisdiction' the 
rights and freedoms sets out in the Convention. This is uncomplicated if applied, for example, 
to a psychiatric hospital in mainland France. '[A]cts of the Contracting States performed, or 
producing effects, outside their territories can constitute an exercise of jurisdiction within the 
meaning of Article 1 only in exceptional cases',143 to be determined in each case on its 
facts.144 The Grand Chamber in Al-Skeini v UK set out circumstances in which exceptions 
have applied. Most, albeit not all, examples in the case law concern overseas military 
operations. Broadly, jurisdiction applies where the ECHR state exercises effective control 
over either a person or persons; or a territory.  
 
'State agent authority and control' means acts of diplomatic and consular agents 'may amount 
to an exercise of jurisdiction when [they] exert authority and control over others.'145 It may 
equally apply when, 'through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of 
that territory, it exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that 
                                                 
137 J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166/12, 23 August 2016. 
138 Ibid, para 87. 
139 Ibid, para 80. 
140 Ibid, para 94.  
141 Ibid, para 95. 
142 Ibid, para 99. 
143 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 55721/07, ECHR 2011, para 131. 
144 Ibid, para 132.  
145 Ibid, para 134. 
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Government.'146 Also, where the use of force by a state's agents who are not in their own 
territory bring an individual under their control, jurisdiction may apply.147  
 
Control giving rise to extra-territorial effect may be territorial, such as when an ECHR state 
party exercises 'effective control of a territory' not its own, by consequence of (lawful or 
unlawful) military action. Whether a state has effective control over a territory is a question 
of fact decided with reference to such indicators as 'the extent to which its military, economic 
and political support for the local subordinate administration provides it with influence and 
control over the region'.148 The ECtHR has not accepted the argument that during 'active 
hostilities' in international armed conflict, international humanitarian law rather than human 
rights law is applicable.149 The ECHR and international humanitarian law apply concurrently. 
Moreover, Jaloud v the Netherlands confirmed that in joint military operations, the fact that 
the UK had operational control did not divest the Netherlands of its jurisdiction and thus its 
responsibility.150 On the high seas, a vessel is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the state 
whose flag it is flying.151  
 
  
                                                 
146 Ibid, para 135. 
147 Ibid, para 136.  
148 Ibid, para 139. 
149 Hassan v. the United Kingdom [GC], no 29750/09, ECHR 2014, paras 76-77. 
150 Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no 11138/10, 23 February 2016 which concerned the 
Moldovan breakaway territory of Transdniestria over which Moldova has no control and which is supported by 
Russia, shows again that jurisdiction may apply concurrently for more than one state. Although Russia had 
effective control (and was found in violation), Moldova still had positive obligations under the ECHR. 
151 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no 27765/09, ECHR 2012. 
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<B>Torture committed by non-ECHR states parties  
 
European standards regarding how people are treated have a reach far beyond the COE area. 
As noted above, the EU regulates the behaviour of third states through trade regulation and 
soft power. Non-refoulement means that extradition requests from third states necessarily 
require an assessment of risk to the individual against ECHR standards. 
 
In several cases the ECtHR has made incontrovertible findings of torture and ill-treatment 
perpetrated by the United States' Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the context of 
extraordinary rendition. Whilst the ECtHR has no jurisdiction to hear cases brought directly 
against the United States, its findings were relevant to cases brought against Poland,152 
Romania153 and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM),154 for  complicity. 
In order to establish these states' involvement, the CIA's activity inevitably had first to be 
established. Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah were both subjected to extraordinary rendition and 
held in CIA-run ‘black sites’ in Poland, where they were tortured by the CIA. Al Nashiri was 
subsequently transferred to Romania where he was held by the CIA in conditions and under a 
regime that cumulatively amounted to inhuman treatment. El-Masri, a German national, was 
arrested by the Macedonian authorities and detained for 23 days without being permitted to 
contact the German authorities. The circumstances of this amounted to inhuman and 
degrading treatment.155 The Macedonian authorities then handed him to the CIA whose 
treatment of him at Skopje airport amounted to torture. FYROM was found 'directly 
responsible' for this 'since its agents actively facilitated the treatment and then failed to take 
any measures that might have been necessary in the circumstances of the case to prevent it 
from occurring.'156 He was then transferred by air to Afghanistan where he was held for 5 
months, in violation of FYROM's non-refoulement obligation.  
 
These cases are significant. Both the COE and EU made important contributions uncovering 
the truth about rendition by commissioning reports to investigate the involvement of 
European states. These are known respectively as the Marty157 and Fava Reports,158 and both 
provide an extraordinary level of detail, naming victims, flight numbers, destinations and 
times. They provided important, but not exclusive, evidence for the ECtHR. The particular 
significance of these cases, however, is they represent definitive finding by an international 
Court that a third state, operating outside both its jurisdiction and that of the Court, has 
committed acts of torture. The United States is a  state party to the ICCPR and UNCAT, but 
does not accept the individual communications procedures of either, nor to that of the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights. El-Masri's case had also collapsed before  the US 
Courts, due to the government invoking 'state secrets privilege' to withhold vital supporting 
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evidence.159 Although the ECtHR could not award reparation or just satisfaction against the 




The prohibition and prevention of torture and other ill-treatment in Europe is not covered by 
a single institution or set of norms. With three principal organizations playing a role in the 
protection and promotion of human rights across the region, Europe is complex, offering 
systems rather than a system. The focus of this Chapter is on the COE and EU laws and 
institutions relevant to the prohibition of torture. Space has not permitted more on the OSCE, 
but its contribution particularly through capacity building and technical support, is not 
insignificant. As outlined above, all Members of the EU are also Members of the COE and 
respectively through Article 4 CFR and Article 3 ECHR, both organisations have binding law 
prohibiting absolutely torture and other ill-treatment. Moreover, within both, the death 
penalty is understood as violating the prohibition. There is intentionally a great deal of 
coherence and synergy between the EU and COE regarding torture. Article 6(3) TEU makes 
clear the ECHR rights are 'general principles' of EU law, whilst Article 52(3) CFR indicates 
the same 'meaning and scope' should be given to Article 4 CFR as it is under Article 3 
ECHR. This provision, and the fact the ECtHR jurisprudence is so rich in setting out the 
content and scope of Article 3, pushes a great deal of emphasis for understanding the 
prohibition onto the COE. As regards accountability, the CFR is rather more limited than the 
ECHR, binding EU states only when they are implementing EU law. A key problem faced by 
the EU is marrying its 'mutual recognition' requirement of states with the non-refoulement 
requirement under Article 4 CFR. This has been addressed by the CJEU in the context of 
EAWs, but not necessarily in the strongest terms that would advance prevention. Indeed, the 
EU's focus on protection from torture is outward looking, addressed to third, non-EU states. 
It is erroneous to assume EU states do not have detention conditions amounting to inhuman 
treatment, or even commit acts of torture, and the EU would do well to create additional 
guidelines directing the conduct of its own states in this regard. The COE has a much more 
advanced system for prevention, provided by the CPT which is now in its 30th year of 
preventive visiting, and also (albeit to a lesser extent and incidentally) by the Pilot Judgment 
system of the ECtHR.  
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